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FEDERAL DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND THE TOXIC WORKPLACE: A CRITIQUE OF
ADA AND SECTION 504 CASE LAW ADDRESSING




Work and the workplace itself have long been recognized
as conferring important benefits on workers and society at
large.' For workers, work provides a source of income and
may provide a sense of self-worth and fulfillment, and the
workplace itself may be a source of community.2 For society,
full or maximized employment provides a source of social
stability and control, and also fuels the economy.3 Congress
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1. Tristin K. Greene, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV.
623, 627 (2005); Thomas E. Geu & Martha S. Davis, Work: A Legal Analysis in
the Context of the Changing Transnational Political Economy, 63 U. CIN. L. REV.
1679, 1681-97 (1995); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 834, 834 (2002) (employment, when balanced with family and civic
commitments, benefits individuals and society).
2. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-92 (2000);
but cf Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional
Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 530 (1997) ("For countless millions, work
is a chore, a burden to be borne, a source of anxiety and conflict.").
3. Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law's
Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 759, 781-85 (2005) (citing
FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 7-22 (1971) (hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD));
see also Brigid Kennedy-Pfister, Continuity and Contradiction in the Theory and
Discourse of Dependence, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 667, 682-83 (2001) (citing
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra, at 7-8 (2d ed. 1993)).
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enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),4 which
was preceded by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,' to
further several of these goals, including allowing qualified
individuals to gain, maintain, and enjoy the benefits of
employment notwithstanding their disabled status and the
prejudices against them. Employment of these individuals, in
turn, causes society to reap the fruits of a more fully
employed work force.'
However, work and the workplace may sometimes cause
harm, and may sometimes even become toxic. The workplace
may cause or exacerbate physical illnesses such as asthma,
lung cancer, and other pulmonary diseases.! The workplace
or work environment may also cause or exacerbate mental
illnesses such as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic
stress syndrome,' although courts have been far more
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)). Within the past two
years, Congress has amended the ADA, enacting the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 ("ADAAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). For a discussion of
those amendments and their relevance (or lack thereof) to the issues addressed
in this Article, see infra notes 34, 35, 40, 85, 86, and 99 and accompanying text.
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
6. In the Findings and Purpose provision of the ADA, Congress found,
among other things, that "many people with physical or mental disabilities have
been precluded from . . . [participating in all aspects of society] because of
discrimination," that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as employment," and that "the continu[ed]
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis . . . and costs the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from
dependency and nonproductivity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 2010); see also
Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25 Years,
22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 158 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Occupational Cancer, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/cancer (last visited Sept. 22, 2010)
("Based on well-documented associations between occupational exposures and
cancer, it is estimated that approximately 20,000 cancer deaths and 40,000 new
cases of cancer each year in the U.S. are attributable to occupation.").
8. See, e.g., Work Organization and Stress-Related Disorders, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, www.cdc.gov/niosh/programs/workorg (last
visited Sept. 22, 2010).
Work organization and job stress are topics of growing concern in the
occupational safety and health field. Job stress results when there is a
poor match between job demands and the capabilities, resources, or
needs of workers. Stress-related disorders encompass a broad array of
conditions, including frank psychological disorders (depression,
anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder) and other emotional
disturbances (dissatisfaction, fatigue, tension, etc.), maladaptive
behaviors (aggression, substance abuse), and cognitive impairment.
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skeptical of and less receptive to such claims.? And, while the
above-described impairments may themselves impede or
prevent a worker from working, those same impairments may
have a substantially adverse-indeed, sometimes
debilitating-impact on other, more fundamental, basic life
functions, including breathing, eating, and sleeping, among
others."o Thus, a day seldom goes by without a report of toxic
mold in a workplace causing life-threatening respiratory or
neurological problems for employees," or excessively stressful
circumstances or relationships at work causing equally life-
impacting mental illness.12
This Article will address judicial treatment of one aspect
of the toxic workplace under the ADA and Section 504.13
Specifically, it will address a line of cases under the ADA
holding that, where an impairment is caused solely by the
work environment and substantially limits major life
activities other than working, the question of whether a
worker is disabled within the meaning of the ADA must be
evaluated under so-called foreclosure or class-based analysis.
Foreclosure/class-based analysis requires that a worker's
Id.
9. See infra note 92.
10. See supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Other Sick Building Stories, SICK BUILDINGS AND TOXIC MOLD,
www.presenting.net/sbs/otherstories.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
12. See, e.g., Facts about Workplace Stress, MEDI-SMART: NURSING
EDUCATION RESOURCES, www.medi-smart.com/stressl.htm (last visited Sept.
22, 2010).
13. Toxic workplaces include work environments that expose workers to
dangerous substances, fumes, or the like. See Michelle Gorton, Comment.
Intentional Disregard: Remedies for the Toxic Workplace, 30 ENVTL. L. 811
(2000). Toxic workplaces, however, also include work environments
characterized by dysfunctional relationships between employees and
management that can lead to stress and thereby cause or exacerbate mental or
physical illness. See Frances E. Zollers & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Workplace
Violence and Security: Are There Lessons for Peacemaking?, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 480 & nn.222-24 (2003) (citing John K. Slage, Attack on
Violence, INDUSTRY WEEKLY, Feb., 17, 1997, at 15; GERALD W. LEWIS & NANCY
C.. ZARE, WORKPLACE HOSTILITY: MYTH AND REALITY 58-66 (1999)). Although
the ADA and Section 504 may apply when working conditions cause
impairments to all employees exposed to the work environment, Hendricks-
Robinson v. Excel Corp., 164 F.R.D. 667 (C.D. Ill. 1996), cited with approval in
David T. Wiley, If You Can't Fight 'Em, Join 'Em: Class Actions Under Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 LAB. LAW. 197, 223-24 (1997), this
Article will primarily focus on the idiosyncratically-toxic workplace, i.e.
workplaces where individual employees have particular susceptibility to
workplace-caused impairments.
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impairment prevent him or her from performing a broad
range or class of jobs. Traditionally, this doctrine applies only
when the single major life activity affected is working.
Ultimately, this Article will reject the holding in those cases.
Part I of the Article will discuss existing ADA and
Section 504 doctrine, outlining the statutory texts, federal
case law, and Congressional intent, thereby providing the
framework for traditional disability discrimination analysis.1 4
Part II will discuss the line of cases alluded to above, tracking
the courts' deviation from traditional analysis.1 5 Part III will
critique that case law, demonstrating that the courts' focus on
causation (a) runs contrary to Congressional intent and that
the resultant use of foreclosure/class-based analysis
contravenes Supreme Court precedent, (b) is illogical and
improperly requires additional issues of proof, and (c) by
unwarrantedly making it more difficult for an employee to
prove disability, and by thereby potentially eliminating
inquiry into the issue of whether the employer might be able
to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability,
prematurely truncates ADA and Section 504 analysis. 6 Part
IV of this Article will place that line of cases in the larger
context of ADA and Section 504 jurisprudence. Specifically,
Part IV will argue that such cases are symptomatic of the
courts' desire to maintain "gate keeper" status on disability
discrimination claims by (a) resolving such cases in favor of
employers on the threshold issue of whether a claimant is
disabled as a matter of law at summary judgment, and (b)
thereby improperly failing to give full play to the reasonable
accommodation provisions of the ADA and Section 504, which
often involve questions of fact not susceptible to summary
judgment and questions of management prerogative
regarding the internal operation of its business." The Article
will conclude by suggesting that, because judicial analysis in
this area has been at odds with both previously- and recently-
stated congressional intent and existing Supreme Court
precedent, the appropriate fix should come from future
judicial decisions, not Congress.'"
14. See infra notes 19-55 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ADA AND SECTION 504
A. Text, Purpose, and the Prima Facie Case
Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to ...
discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."19 Similarly, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o
otherwise qualified person with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."20 As
discussed above,2 1 the "basic purpose" of the ADA and Section
504 "is to ensure that [disabled] individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the prejudic[iall attitude[] or
the ignorance of others."22 Or, as stated by one district court,
"[t]he ADA and Rehabilitation Act are interrelated
Congressional mandates designed to remedy discrimination
against disabled individuals."2 3
To prove a claim under the ADA, an employee must prove
that he or she (1) is disabled under the Act, (2) is a qualified
individual with a disability, and (3) has been discriminated
against because of the disability.2 4 The analysis is essentially
the same under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, with an
employee also having to prove that the employer receives
federal funding.2 5
B. Proving Disability-Impairments, Effect on Major Life
Activities, and the Foreclosure/ Class-Based Test
Under the ADA, a disability is defined as "a physical or
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
22. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
23. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1089 (D. Colo.
2006).
24. Richardson v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2010);
Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009); Bates v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2007).
25. Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 79 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000);
Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1999).
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mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ...
major life activities . . ."26 that has a permanent or long-term
effect.27 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has defined "physical impairment" as a
"physiological disorder, or condition . . . affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal . . . respiratory . . . cardiovascular . . .
digestive . . . [and] skin . . . ."28 Thus, physical illnesses such
as asthma, migraine headaches, and cancer have all been
deemed physical impairments under the ADA or Section
504.29 The EEOC has also defined "mental impairment" to
mean "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as ...
emotional or mental illness . . . ."3 Thus, numerous courts
have held that depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress
syndrome, and panic attacks are emotional or mental
illnesses that constitute mental impairments under the ADA
or Section 504."
The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that
"[m]erely having an impairment does not make one disabled
for purposes of the ADA;" rather, "[claimants also need to
demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life
activity."3 2 A major life activity must be of "comparative
importance" and "central to the life process itself" and it need
not have a "public, economic, or daily character."3 3
Under recent amendments to the ADA, major life
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), cited in Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. &
Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 2009).
27. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2009).
29. Rivera-Rodriquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 23 (1st
Cir. 2001) (asthma); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th
Cir. 1996) (cancer); Lee v. City of Columbus, No. 2:07-cv-1230, 2009 WL
2929439, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2009) (migraine headaches).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2009).
31. Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2006)
(depression); Rohan v. Network Presentations, LLC, 375 F. 3d 266, 273-74 (4th
Cir. 2004) (post-traumatic stress disorder); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-
Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1983) (anxiety and
depression); Wilson v. Alamosa Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-00607-WDM-CBS, 2009
WL 2139776, at *4 (D. Colo. July 15, 2009) (anxiety and stress); Clinkscales v.
Children's Hosp. of Phila., No. 06-3919, 2009 WL 1259104, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May
7, 2009); Meador v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., No. 06 C 2705, 2007 WL
4162809, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2007) (panic attacks).
32. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195.
33. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
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activities have been broadened to "include, but are not limited
to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating and working."34 This statutory
amendment codified a number of judicial decisions that had
held that several fundamental activities, not specifically
listed in the regulations implementing the ADA, constituted
major life activities under the ADA. 5 Given the broad range
of ADA-cognizable major life activities falling outside the
context of working, the Supreme Court has rejected the
notion "that the question of whether an impairment
constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing
the effect of the impairment in the workplace."3 6 The Court
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A) (2010); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The
ADAAA also defines major life activities to include "the operation of a major
bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system,
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B).
The ADAAA makes several other important changes to the ADA. First, the
ADAAA requires that, with limited exception, "[tihe determination of whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without
regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures," § 12102(4)(E)(i),
thereby statutorily reversing the Supreme Court's decisions in Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and two companion cases, Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555 (1999). Second and third, the ADAAA requires that "[tihe
definition of disability in [the ADA] shall be construed in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under [the ADA], to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms of [the ADA]," § 12102(4)(A), and provides that "[ain impairment that
is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major
life activity when active," § 12102(4)(D), thereby (again) statutorily reversing
the Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the ADA on those issues in Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Only these latter two
statutory changes, however, impact the issues addressed in this Article, and
only do so indirectly. See infra note 86; see also infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
35. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638-39 (sexual reproduction); E.E.O.C. v. Chevron
Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2009) (sleeping); Adams v. Rice,
531 F.3d 936, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (sexual relations); Battle, 438 F.3d at 861
(thinking and concentrating); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir.
2003) (eating). Prior to the ADAAA, courts had split over whether interacting
with others constituted a major life activity. Compare McAlindin v. County of
San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1999) with Soileau v. Guilford of
Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997). Because Congress did not specifically
list interacting with others as a major life activity, but utilized "including but
not limited to" language in the ADAAA, the question remains open. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A).
36. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 201; see also Rohr v. Salt River Project
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buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that the ADA's
definition of disability applies to public transportation and
privately-provided public accommodation cases, in addition to
employment cases, stating that the ADA "is intended to cover
individuals with disabling impairments regardless of whether
the individuals have any connection to a workplace."'
In employment cases, the Supreme Court and numerous
other courts have held that, when the major life activity
affected by the impairment is working, a "foreclosure" or
class-based test must be applied. Thus, when working is the
major life activity affected by the impairment, "the statutory
phrase 'substantially limits' requires ... that plaintiffs allege
they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs" or in a
"'broad range' of jobs, rather than a specific job.""
Conversely, where an impairment affects a major life activity
other than working, the Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor
Mfg., made clear that working need not be analyzed in ADA
employment cases and specifically held that "[n]othing in the
text of the [ADA], our previous opinions, or the regulations
suggests that a class-based framework should apply . . . .""
Numerous pre- and post-Toyota Motor Mfg. lower court
Agric. Imp. and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 858 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009)
The Supreme Court has made clear that the substantial limitation
inquiry is not limited to the effects of the impairment in the workplace.
. . . Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the . . . impairment
substantially limits the claimed major life activity in daily life. Put
another way, "[wihether [a plaintiff) faced substantial limitations in his
ability to work is irrelevant to whether his limitations in other major
life activities qualify him as disabled for ADA purposes."
Id. (quoting McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233) (citations omitted).
37. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 201.
38. Id. at 200 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92) ("With respect to the major
life activity of working[,] [tihe term substantially limits means significantly
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities.") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 16302(j)(3) (2001) (emphasis
added by court)). As quoted above, the Supreme Court, tracking the language
utilized in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3), has referred to the legal standard as "class-
based" analysis. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200-01. Other courts,
however, have referred to the standard as a "foreclosure" test. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.
1996) (per curiam). The terms will be used interchangeably in this Article.
39. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200. The Supreme Court's rejection of
the class-based framework in cases involving major life activities other than
working was the only employee-favoring aspect of the decision. See supra note
34.
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decisions and EEOC regulations are in accord.40
C. Proof of Causation
Although proof of an impairment's substantial effect on a
major life activity is essential under the ADA and Section
504, proof of the cause of the disability is not. Thus, several
courts, quoting legislative history underlying the ADA, have
stated that "[the cause of a disability is always irrelevant to
the determination of disability."4 ' Likewise, several courts,
evaluating disability claims under Section 504, have stated
that "[tihe Rehabilitation Act contains no language
40. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir.
1999) ("A separate [class-based] analysis is applied under the regulations to
determine when the major life activity of working is substantially limited, see . .
. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3), but since we find [claimant's] illness affected major life
activities even more fundamental than working, we need not analyze her
disorder's impact on her ability to work.") (citation omitted); Burns v. Chi. Park
Dist., No. 99 C 3479, 2002 WL 31018363, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2002) (class-
based analysis inapplicable where major life activity affected is other than
working); Watson v. Hughston Sports Med. Hosp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1350
n.3 (M.D. Ga. 2002) (same); Jackson v. Lake County, No. 01 C 6528, 2002 WL
808351, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2002)
Although it is questionable whether [plaintiffl could state a claim with
respect to the major life activity of 'working' because he does not
specifically allege he was regarded as 'unable to work in a broad class
of jobs,' the court need not decide this question at this stage, since he
has also included allegations that he was regarded as substantially
impaired in other major activities such as "learning."
Id. (citation omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) ("If an
individual is substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination should be made as to whether the individual is substantially
limited in working."). Commentators agree with these court decisions. See, e.g.,
Douglas A. Blair, Employees Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or Clinical
Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347, 1400 (1999)
("[A]n employee should rely on working as a major life activity only as a last
resort."); Randal I. Goldstein, Mental Illness in the Workplace after Sutton v.
United Airlines, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 949 (2001) ("[Djue to the difficult
evidentiary standard in cases involving the major life activity of working, many
future plaintiffs will need to bring claims based on other major life activities
that have been successful in the wake of Sutton."). Congress, albeit indirectly,
essentially codified these well-established principles of ADA law in the ADAAA,
enacting a rule of construction which states that "[an impairment that
substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life
activities in order to be considered a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C).
41. Henderson v. N.Y. Life, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 527, 531 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Committee on the Judiciary
Report, H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (III) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. Vol.
4., 451-52). See, e.g., Lawrence v. Metro-Dade Police Dept., 872 F. Supp. 950,
956 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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suggesting that its protection is limited to how an individual
became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to his
or her impairment."4 2 Courts and commentators have
reached the same conclusion regarding the etiology of
physical and mental impairments, stating that "[tihe ADA
and regulations under it are simply devoid of any
requirement that a physiological disorder or condition have a
scientific name or known etiology," 43 and that "the key in
psychiatric disability cases-as in all other disability cases-
is to look at the manifestations of disability rather than the
etiology of the disability."' Indeed, in at least three federal
or state law disability discrimination cases where employees
alleged that their employer caused their impairments, the
courts refused to evaluate causation for purposes of disability
discrimination analysis, stating in the most recent decision
that "[p]laintiffs status as a qualified individual with a
disability does not depend on the cause of his disability, but
on the extent of his disability."4 5
Although Congress, courts, and commentators have not
directly addressed the issue, the congressional and judicial
refusal to allow or to require inquiry into the cause of an
impairment appears to stem from their reluctance to (1)
(further) complicate ADA and Section 504 cases with
additional issues of proof,46 (2) bring tort concepts of
causation into federal statutes designed, not to compensate
plaintiffs for personal injury, but to allow qualified
individuals to enter or remain in the workforce, 47 and (3)
42. Cook v. State of R.I., Dept. of MHRH, 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993); see
also Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe source of an
impairment is irrelevant to a determination of whether that impairment
constitutes a disability . . . .").
43. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
see also Woodson v. Cook County Sheriff, No. 96 C 3864, 1996 WL 604051, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1996) (allegation that plaintiff suffered from chronic fatigue
syndrome, a condition of unknown etiology that substantially limited major life
activities, sufficient to state claim under ADA).
44. Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, the
Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 817 (1998).
45. Trotter v. B & S Aircraft Parts & Accessories, Inc., No. 94-1404-FGT,
1996 WL 473837, at *9 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 1996) (ADA) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also August v. Officers Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 583 (1st Cir.
1992) (state handicapped discrimination law); Simo v. Home Health & Hospice
Care, 906 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D. N.H. 1995) (Section 504).
46. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
47. See August, 981 F.2d at 583 (contrasting state handicap discrimination
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based on the ADA and Section 504's statuses as civil rights
statutes, to avoid potentially "re-victimizing" individuals
previously and traditionally subject to discrimination.4 8 As to
this latter point, just as Congress and the courts would not
countenance employer or judicial inquiry into how an
individual became a member of a protected class-indeed,
such inquiry would be absurd in cases involving immutable
characteristics such as race, ethnicity and age, among
others-Congress and the courts have wisely chosen not to
open that area of inquiry in disability discrimination cases
either.
D. Qualified Individuals, Reasonable Accommodation, and
Undue Hardship
Once a court determines that an individual is disabled
under the ADA or Section 504, the court looks to whether the
person is a qualified individual under the two federal
statutes. Under the ADA and Section 504, a qualified
individual includes "an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."4 9 Under the ADA's implementing
regulations, "[t]he term essential functions means the
fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires."5o Under the
ADA and Section 504, a reasonable accommodation may
include "reassignment to a vacant position,"" a transfer,52 or
law and tort causation requirements); Trotter, 1996 WL 473837, at *10 (same
contrast regarding ADA and tort requirements on causation); see also Henrietta
D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 279 n.8 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on tort proximate
cause principles for guidance on issue of whether employer discriminated
against employee because of her disability in ADA and Section 504 case, but
leaving open question whether common law tort causation principles invariably
apply to that issue or to other aspects of disability discrimination analysis).
48. See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with
Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341, 1398 n.238 (1993); Caroline Palmer &
Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross: Evolving and Emerging Legal Issues in
the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455,
483 (2001) (discussing "double victimization" of disability discrimination
litigants by employers and courts).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006), cited in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 396 (2002).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B), cited in Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457
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an unpaid leave of absence of finite duration that will
plausibly, or is reasonably likely to, allow the employee to
return to work." Under the ADA, prohibited discrimination
includes an employer's "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] business."54 Where, however, a court finds
and concludes that an employee is not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, it need not reach the issue of whether
the employer failed to provide the employee with a reasonable
accommodation. 5
In sum, (1) ADA and Section 504 doctrine protects
individuals afflicted with physical or mental impairments
that substantially limit major life activities, (2) only the
major life activity of working triggers class-based analysis, (3)
the cause of an impairment is irrelevant to ADA and Section
504 analysis, and (4) once an individual is recognized as
disabled under the ADA and Section 504, all that should
matter is whether the individual can perform the essential
functions of the position that he or she holds or seeks, with or
without a reasonable accommodation from his or her
employer.
II. THE CASES
The lead case is Rhoads v. FDIC." In Rhoads, a former
bank employee who suffered from asthma and migraines
caused by her working conditions brought, among other
F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 2006).
52. Bellino v. Peters, 530 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2008); Burns v. Coca-Cola
Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2000).
53. Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6; Humphrey v. Mem'1 Hosp. Ass'n, 239 F.3d
1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 366,
376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), quoted in U.S. Airways, Inc., 535 U.S. at 396.
55. Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236, 242 (1st Cir. 2001);
Lampe v. Anderson News Corp., No. 94-16608, 1996 WL 56108, at *2 (D. Az.
Feb. 9, 1996); McDonald v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir.
1995); Czapinski v. Iron City Indus. Cleaning Corp., No. 07-717, 2009 WL
614808, at *4 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 2009); Carlson v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 237 F. Supp.
2d 114, 123-24 (D. Me. 2003).
56. 956 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1997), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 257 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2001).
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claims, an ADA claim against her former employer, a
financial institution that had been placed in receivership.17
The district court rejected Rhoads's ADA claim on cross-
motions for summary judgment, rejecting the claim that she
was disabled because her physical impairments substantially
limited her major life activities of working and breathing."
Thus, as to Rhoads's working claim, the court stated as
follows:
In this case, plaintiff alleges that she was unable to work
in a smoke-filled environment due to the effect smoke had
on her breathing and headaches. However, there appears
to be no reasonable material or relevant factual dispute
concerning the plaintiffs ability to perform her job
requirements at a very high level, provided that she is
given the opportunity to perform her work in a smoke-free
atmosphere . . . . Thus, applying the . . . foreclosure test,
Rhoads cannot argue that a class of jobs free from
exposure to smoke has been foreclosed as a result of her
impairments, and hence, Rhoads cannot show her ability
to work is substantially limited. Consequently, as
Rhoads's strongest claim of substantial impairment to a
major life activity, i.e., her ability to work, fails, Rhoads's
claim that she has a disability is fatally weakened.
The district court also rejected Rhoads's breathing claim,
again applying the foreclosure test and stating as follows:
The plaintiff, however, strenuously argues application of
the foreclosure test to her claim is only a starting point for
determining whether or not she is a disabled individual
because she alleges additional major life activities, such as
breathing, are affected by the asthma and migraines she
suffers when exposed to smoke. See Williams v. Channel
Master Satellite Systems, Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.
1996) (per curiam) ("the general foreclosure test applies
only to claims brought under the major life activity of
working."). On the surface, plaintiffs argument has merit.
Indeed, to find otherwise would allow employers to avoid
grappling with their responsibility to accommodate
employees with a disability that effects [sic] numerous
aspects of their lives, in contravention of the ADA.
However, where the additional major life activities which
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1246-47.
59. Id. at 1246.
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the plaintiff claims are substantially limited, such as the
ability to "breathe," are all triggered solely by her
workplace environment, the traditional approach found in
the ADA for determining whether such impairments are
sufficiently severe to be classified as a disability appears
inadequate. In these limited circumstances, the proper
inquiry should remain focussed on the extent to which an
ADA claimant is capable of successfully pursuing a given
vocation with or without reasonable accommodation.60
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating that:
We accordingly hold that, where an ADA plaintiff asserts
that she is disabled based on a substantial limitation of a
major life activity other than working, but her condition is
aggravated solely by her workplace environment, her
claim must be assessed under our foreclosure test for a
limitation on working. . . . As already discussed above,
Rhoads's claim fails under its requirements.
If . .. Rhoads had shown that she was debilitated by
exposure to secondhand smoke outside of the work-place,
then the proper inquiry would have been whether her
ability to breathe, etc., was "significantly restricted" as
compared to the breathing ability of the "average person
in the general population." However, because Rhoads
established that her abilities to breathe and engage in
other life activities were limited only by her exposure to
tobacco smoke in the workplace, the proper inquiry is
whether, pursuant to the foreclosure test, she was
substantially limited in her ability to work.*
Between the district court's and the Fourth Circuit's
opinions in Rhoads, the Northern District of California
addressed a similar issue in Benson v. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.6 2 In Benson, the plaintiff, a human
resources specialist, brought claims against her former
employer, defendant Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories ("LLNL"), alleging, among other things, that
LLNL violated the ADA when she encountered problems
breathing in her primary workplace." Although LLNL had
transferred her to a trailer where her breathing problems
60. Id. at 1246-47 (emphasis added).
61. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 257 F.3d at 389-90.
62. No. C95-2746 FMS, 1997 WL 651349 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997).
63. Id.
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subsided, she continued to have problems working and
breathing at her prior worksite, where, according to her
supervisor, a significant number of "workshops, meetings,
and programmatic activities" within her job assignment
occurred.'
As in Rhoads, the district court granted summary
judgment in LLNL's favor, finding and concluding that
because Benson only had difficulty breathing at.one worksite,
but was not foreclosed from working (and breathing) at a
broad class of job, she was not impaired in the major life
activity of working." The district court, quoting the district
court's opinion in Rhoads, likewise rejected Benson's
contention that she was impaired in the major life activity of
breathing." Thus, as in Rhoads, the court held that where an
employee's impairment is triggered solely by her workplace
environment, the foreclosure analysis applicable to the major
life activity of working must inform the court's conclusion."
And, the district court rejected Benson's argument that her
breathing impairment was caused, at least in part, by factors
outside her workplace, finding and concluding that Benson
"ha[d] not offered evidence to show that her symptoms were
triggered by anything but her work environment.""
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in
an unpublished opinion." The Court of Appeals did so
without citing or discussing the district court's opinion in
Rhoads."
In the only relevant Court of Appeals decision post-dating
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rhoads, the Ninth Circuit
addressed the legal effect of impairments caused by working
conditions that limit both working and other major life
activities." In Tyler, the plaintiff was bitten by an insect
nesting near the distribution center of his employer, Target
64. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Benson v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., No. C95-2746 FMS, 1997 WL
651349 at *4 n.5.
69. Benson v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'1 Lab., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished).
70. Id.
71. Tyler v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 42 F. Appx. 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Stores, and subsequently suffered severe allergic reactions.72
Due to the insect bites and allergies, Tyler could not work,
care for himself, sleep, or eat properly. When Tyler
requested an accommodation, Target refused and placed him
on unpaid medical leave.7 ' Tyler eventually sued under the
ADA; however, the district court granted summary judgment
against him, finding and concluding that he was not disabled
within the meaning of the statute.
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision. The Court of Appeals first rejected Tyler's claim
that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, concluding, as in Rhoads and Benson, that the
limitations on Tyler's ability to work at one type of job were
legally insufficient to prove a disability under the ADA." The
Court of Appeals also rejected Tyler's claims that he was
substantially limited in other major life activities, holding as
follows:
Tyler additionally contends that he is substantially
limited in many other major life activities, that when
afflicted with an allergic reaction, he is not only unable to
work, but is also unable to care for himself, sleep or
perform various essential manual tasks. Assuming,
without deciding, that this is true, Tyler is still unable to
press a viable claim under the ADA because the
limitations on these other activities are products solely of
his exposure to VBGs [Valley Black Gnats] at the
workplace. In this situation, "the proper inquiry should
remain focused on the extent to which an ADA claimant is
capable of successfully pursuing a given vocation with or
without reasonable accommodation. . . ." Because Tyler's
"limitation was . . . created or aggravated solely by [his]
work environment," . . . we do not think his other
limitations place him under the protection of the ADA.7
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion does not identify the specific
accommodation requested, the briefing on appeal indicates that Tyler requested
accommodations in the form of a "transfer, time off, or reassignment."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, Tyler v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 42 F. Appx. 934
(9th Cir. 2002) (No. CIV S-00-756), 2001 WL 34103692 at *1.
75. Tyler, 42 F. Appx. at 934.
76. Id. at 935.
77. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 956 F. Supp. 1239,
1247 (D. Md. 1997), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 257 F.3d
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The Court of Appeals concluded by opining that Congress
did not intend for the ADA to cover employees in Tyler's
circumstances, stating:
The ADA protects people whose disability precludes them
from working in a broad class of jobs. While the allergic
reactions Tyler endured were serious, we cannot say he
was disabled under the ADA where the impairment is the
result of working at one place during one period of time. If
this were the kind of disability that Congress really meant
to redress, it could do so in future amendments to the
statute. The precedents that constrain our consideration
do not in the meantime permit an extension of the ADA's
protections here. Until this legal landscape shifts, we
must affirm the district court's ruling in favor of Target.
Thus, under the legal standard applied in each of the
above-discussed decisions, ADA plaintiffs were forced to
either suffer physically in the workplace or quit their jobs,
rather than receive accommodations from their employers."
373, 389 (4th Cir. 2001)).
78. Id. For additional decisions adopting and applying the standard
articulated in Rhoads, see Camacho v. Pemeo World Air Servs., Inc., No.
1:05cv503-MHT, 2006 WL 2827243, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 2, 2006); Crumel v.
Hampton Univ., No. Civ.A. 4:05CV31, 2005 WL 3357315, at *6 (E. D. Va. Dec. 8,
2005); Darnell v. Principi, No. 03-987-KI, 2004 WL 1824120, at *3-4 (D. Or.
Aug. 4, 2004); Merit v. Se. Pa. Transit Auth., 315 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 & n.22
(E.D. Pa. 2004); Reagan v. England, 218 F. Supp. 2d 742, 747 & n.5 (D. Md.
2002); Sanders v. FMAS Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (D. Md. 2001); Kidwell
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Shawnee County, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1220 & n.6
(D. Kan. 1998).
79. The legal standard applied clearly affected the results of these cases.
The decisions may also be partly attributable to the unique facts in the cases, a
mischaracterization of the facts and the plaintiffs' claim by the courts, or bad
tactical decisions by the plaintiffs (or some combination thereof). In each of the
cases, the courts found that plaintiffs' impairments were triggered by air
quality and other conditions solely in their respective workplaces. However, the
courts' findings seem highly suspect, given that the impairments alleged-
asthma and allergies-could almost certainly be caused by conditions outside of
the workplace as well-such as bars or nightclubs where smoking has not been
banned by state law or local ordinance (an increasingly infrequent circumstance
in many parts of the United States), or churches burning incense as part of
their religious practice. Indeed, in each of the cases, the plaintiffs argued or
presented evidence that their impairments were also triggered by non-
workplace conditions. In each instance, however, the courts chose to ignore the
plaintiffs' factual showing or characterized it as inadequate. Also, as discussed
above, given that the plaintiffs' impairments substantially limited their major
life activities other than working, and given that "working" cases are analyzed
under the employer-favoring class-based test, the plaintiffs in Rhoads and Tyler
would have been better served-and would have been less likely to have led the
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III. CRITIQUE
A. Utilizing Foreclosure /Class-Based Analysis when an
Impairment is Caused or Exacerbated by the Work
Environment and Substantially Affects Major Life Activities
other than Working is Contrary to Congressional Intent and
Supreme Court Case Law
As discussed above, Congress, in enacting both the ADA
and Section 504, expressly stated that the cause or etiology of
an impairment is of no legal moment under either of those
federal disability discrimination statutes.80 Notwithstanding
Congress's clear statement of legislative intent, Rhoads and
its progeny hold that the foreclosure test must be applied to
disability discrimination plaintiffs' claims when their
impairment is caused solely by the work environment." By
so holding, those courts, with no indication that they are
consciously doing so, have acted directly contrary to
congressional intent and have carved out a category of cases
where causation improperly matters.
courts in the direction of class-based analysis-by not characterizing their cases
as "working" cases at all. See Blair, supra note 40; Goldstein, supra note 40; see
also Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They
Fare Better Before A Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 Rev. Litig. 505,
510-57, 574 (2000). However, even in Benson, where the plaintiff deliberately
attempted to plead and prove her case as a "breathing" case only, the district
court applied the class-based test and ruled against her. See Benson v.
Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished).
80. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
82. It might be argued that Congress's determination that causation is
irrelevant in disability discrimination cases was an attempt to ensure that
impairments caused by voluntary (albeit, in some cases, addiction-based)
conduct-e.g., lung cancer caused by cigarette smoking or morbid obesity caused
by overeating-do not receive protection under the ADA and Section 504.
However, the House Report, discussing impairments and major life activities
under the ADA, stated as follows:
... [Ihf a person is employed as a painter and is assigned to work with a
unique paint which caused severe allergies, such as skin rashes or
seizures, the person would be substantially limited in a major life
activity, by virtue of the resulting skin disease or seizure disorder. The
cause of a disability is always irrelevant to the determination of
disability. In such a case, a reasonable accommodation to the employee
may include assignment to other areas where the particular paint is
not used.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 451-52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. Vol. 4.,
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In addition, the Rhoads line of cases, by evaluating
impairments triggered or exacerbated by the work
environment under the foreclosure test when the impairment
substantially limits major life activities other than working,
ignores well-settled Supreme Court and lower court precedent
related to analyzing the effect of impairments on major life
activities.' As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held
that class-based analysis does not apply when an impairment
substantially affects a major life activity other than
working.' Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding,
numerous lower courts and the EEOC have made clear that,
where an ADA or Section 504 plaintiff has demonstrated that
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity other
than or more fundamental than working, the effect of the
impairment on working-and, in turn, the question of
whether the impairment prevents the plaintiff from working
in a broad range of jobs-should not be analyzed."
Thus, with essentially no analysis, Rhoads and its
progeny blithely ignore Congressional intent concerning the
causation issue, as well as ignore Supreme Court and lower
court authority regarding the circumscribed roles of working
as a major life activity and foreclosure/class-based analysis in
ADA and Section 504 jurisprudence."
451-52. Thus, the House Report makes clear that Congress, in discussing the
irrelevance of causation, was referring to the relationship between the work
environment and an ADA- and Section 504-cognizable impairment, and not
between voluntary conduct and impairment. For a discussion regarding
assessing voluntary conduct under the ADA, see Lisa E. Key, Voluntary
Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretation of "Reasonable
Accommodations," 48 HASTINGS L. J. 75 (1996).
83. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 40. The result in Rhoads, by giving primacy to the major
life activity of working over all other major life activities, is also inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's twice-stated reluctance, prior to Congress's
enactment of the ADAAA, to recognize working as a major life activity under
the ADA. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200
(2002) (noting "conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working
could be a major life activity," assuming so based on parties' agreement, but not
deciding the question) and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492
(1999) (noting same conceptual difficulty and, again, not deciding the question).
Congress definitively resolved the issue in 2008 by adding working to the list of
major life activities codified in the ADAAA. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
86. As discussed above, Congress, in enacting the ADAAA, reversed those
portions of the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota Motor Mfg. requiring a
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B. Rhoads and its Progeny's Focus on Causation is Improper
for Other Reasons
In addition to running counter to Congressional intent
and Supreme Court case law, the Rhoads line of cases' focus
on causation is illogical and needlessly injects additional
issues of proof into toxic workplace cases under the ADA and
Section 504.
Although the Rhoads district court suggested that "the
traditional approach found in the ADA for determining
whether . . . impairments [caused solely by the workplace
environment] are sufficiently severe to be classified as a
disability appears inadequate,"" neither that district court
decision nor any other post-Rhoads decision has described the
nature of the perceived inadequacy of traditional ADA
analysis under those circumstances. Likewise, neither the
Rhoads courts, nor any other court relying on Rhoads, has
given the slightest hint as to why their focus on causation,
their refusal to analyze the effect of an impairment on major
life activities other than working, and their use of the
foreclosure/class-based analysis cures any such unarticulated
inadequacy.
For a disability discrimination plaintiff suffering from
workplace-induced or -exacerbated asthma or depression, it
matters little or not at all whether the impairment was
caused inside the workplace, outside the workplace, or both.
Whatever the cause of the impairment, the purpose of
disability discrimination laws-to allow qualified individuals
suffering from impairments to remain in the workplace like
their non-disabled co-workers, insofar as their employers
have the ability to reasonably accommodate them-applies
restrictive reading of the definition of disability and refusing to include episodic
or intermittent impairments that otherwise satisfied the requirements of the
ADA within the definition of disability. See supra note 34. The statutory
changes wrought by the ADAAA do not directly address the above-discussed
flaws in Rhoads and its progeny, nor did Congress intend them to do so.
However, to the extent that courts, in future decisions, are tempted to rely on
Rhoads-inspired jurisprudence to justify a narrow definition of disability, based
on an evaluation of causation and application of the foreclosure test when the
major life activity impaired is other than working, or to hold, as in Benson and
Tyler, that the ADA does not cover employees who are precluded from working
at only one worksite-arguably, an episodic impairment-the above-discussed
ADAAA provisions will militate against any such reading of the ADA.
87. Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 956 F. Supp. 1239, 1247 (D. Md. 1997); see also
supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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with equal force. Similarly, looking at the effect of Rhoads-
inspired case law on employers, it is both illogical and more-
than-a-little ironic that an employer who causes an
employee's impairment should be subject to a more employer-
favoring standard--one that foregoes analysis of the effect of
an impairment on an employee's major life activities other
than working, and requires that an employee's impairment
precludes or restricts the employee from working in a broad
range of jobs, rather than a single job-while an employer
who has no causal role in an employee's impairment is subject
to the traditional, more rigorous, less employer-favoring ADA
and Section 504 analysis.
In addition to logical shortcomings, Rhoads and its
progeny's focus on causation results in problems of proof not
faced by any other class of ADA and Section 504 claimants.
Disability discrimination plaintiffs whose impairments may
be caused or exacerbated by conditions in the workplace,
unlike any other class of ADA or Section 504 disability
discrimination plaintiffs, are required to demonstrate not just
the fact, but also the source, of their impairments. Moreover,
commentators have rightly pointed out that the cause of
physical impairments like asthma or mental impairments
such as depression or anxiety-each of which may be caused
or exacerbated both inside or outside the workplace-are
often difficult to prove with any degree of medical or legal
certainty." Thus, under cases governed by the Rhoads line of
decisions, but no other class of disability discrimination cases,
additional, difficult, and often expensive issues of proof will
be added to a disability discrimination plaintiffs burden of
proof (and the defendant's rebuttal)-which, even without
88. See, e.g., Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and There
is Nothing Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act's Disservice to
Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 744-45 (2004)
Though mental illness may be theoretically provable, it likely occurs as
a result of some type of brain malfunctioning, and therefore, because
we lack the medical technology to verify such malfunctioning during
diagnosis, we must often rely solely upon "symptomatology" without
"proof" to back it. Further, the source of the illness may be difficult to
ascertain, as most mental illnesses are due to varied, and sometimes
indirect, causes.
Id. Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 23 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 605 (1991) (discussing difficulty in proving
causation of physical illnesses such as cancer and birth defects in toxic tort
cases).
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causation issues, frequently require both plaintiffs and
defendants to retain medical, vocational, and economic or
financial experts."
In sum, the Rhoads line of cases' focus on causation
defies logic and unwarrantedly injects into the analysis
substantial issues of proof not encountered by other disability
discrimination plaintiffs. For these additional reasons,
Rhoads and its progeny's focus on causation in toxic
workplace cases under the ADA and Section 504 is improper.
C. By Improperly Analyzing the Disability Issue, Rhoads and
its Progeny Undercut the ADA and Section 504 by Avoiding
the Reasonable Accommodation Issue
As discussed above, when a court determines that a
disability discrimination claimant is not disabled under the
ADA or Section 504, the court need not, and invariably does
not, reach the issue of whether the employer could reasonably
accommodate the employee's impairment.o
Thus, under the Rhoads line of cases, a disability
discrimination claimant whose impairment is caused or
triggered solely by his or her work environment is precluded
from demonstrating that his or her impairment substantially
affects a major life activity other than working, and may not
be able to prove that his or her impairment precludes his or
her working from a broad range of jobs under foreclosure or
class-based analysis. If so, then the claimant will not be
allowed to prove that his or her employer could reasonably
accommodate the claimant's disability by providing him or
her with a reassignment, job swap, transfer, or an unpaid
leave of absence.
For example, in the most typical fact pattern under
Rhoads and its progeny-a disability discrimination claimant
with a physical impairment such as asthma caused by
adverse air quality in the workplace-the employer need not
address or correct the adverse condition causing the
employee's impairment and caused by the employer itself
(unless required to do so by the state or federal occupational
safety or environmental laws) by transferring the employee to
89. John V. Jansonius & Andrew M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in
Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Admissibility, 50
BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (1998).
90. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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another worksite, if a position at another site is available."
Likewise, under the Rhoads line of cases, an employer who
becomes aware that the work environment-in the form of an
employee's relationship with a supervisor or co-worker-has
caused a disability discrimination claimant to be afflicted
with a mental illness, such as clinical depression or anxiety,
is under no legal duty to reasonably accommodate the
claimant-by (again) either transferring the employee to
another job site and, hence, another supervisor or set of co-
workers, or providing the employee with a leave of absence so
that he or she could obtain psychological or psychiatric
treatment to alleviate or remedy the mental illness.92
91. This outcome works a particularly harsh result in idiosyncratically-toxic
workplaces, i.e. where individual employees, but not a larger complement of
workers, suffer from a workplace-caused or -exacerbated impairment, since
occupational safety or environmental laws will not generally be a source of relief
for those individual employees. See Nat'l Realty & Const. Co., Inc., v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cited in Tosh Anderson, Overwork Robs Workers' Health: Interpreting
OSHA's General Duty Clause to Prohibit Long Work Hours, 7 N. Y. CITY L. REV.
85 (2004) and David J. Kolesar, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General
Duty Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079,
2096 (1992).
92. Courts, reflecting societal aversion to recognizing that mental illnesses
may be caused or exacerbated by the workplace, have been singularly
unreceptive to such claims under the ADA, often cursorily dismissing them as
involving "personality conflicts." See, e.g., Potter v. Xerox Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
109, 112-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting cases). A review of the cases, however,
reveals that (a) courts have almost universally focused on whether a plaintiffs
mental impairment has substantially limited the major life activity of working
and, focusing on working alone, have held that the plaintiff was not disabled
under the ADA and foreclosure analysis because the plaintiff was able to work
at another job site or with another supervisor, and (b) the plaintiffs did not
claim that, and the courts did not analyze whether, the plaintiffs' mental
impairment substantially limited a major life activity other than working,
which, under Toyota Motor Mfg., would have placed the case outside of class-
based analysis. Id. The few judicial decisions showing any receptivity to
workplace-caused or workplace-exacerbated mental impairment claims under
the ADA stem from the court's reasoning in Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
County, Ill., 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997). There, Judge Posner, although
writing for a majority that rejected the plaintiffs ADA claim on other grounds,
stated as follows:
. . . [I]f a personality conflict triggers a serious mental illness that is in
turn disabling, the fact that the trigger was not itself a disabling illness
is no defense. Schizophrenia and other psychoses are frequently
triggered by minor accidents or other sources of normal stress. Before
then the individual seemed perfectly normal; after that he may be
incapable of productive employment for the rest of his life. . . .
(Palmer's paranoid delusions concerning her supervisor are typical
symptoms of schizophrenia, although her psychiatrist did not use the
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Under Rhoads and its progeny and, more generally,
under the class-based analysis standard applicable to the
major life activity of working, a cruel irony exists. Class-
based analysis often prevents a disability discrimination
plaintiff from even being considered disabled under the ADA
and Section 504, since he or she would not be precluded from
performing a broad range of jobs. This result ensues, even
though the reasonable accommodation often sought-
reassignment or a job transfer-would plausibly allow that
same plaintiff to be a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADA or Section 504, i.e., perform the essential
function of a similar job (with a reasonable accommodation).
Again, the inconsistency between this result and the purpose
of the ADA and Section 504 is palpable."
Moreover, courts, by reversing the trend started in
Rhoads-specifically, by jettisoning their improper focus on
causation, properly considering the effect of impairments on
major life activities other than working, and not defaulting to
foreclosure/class-based analysis-would not invariably harm
employers' legitimate interests.
In this regard, even if transferring a physically- or
mentally-impaired individual to a different position, or
term.) Psychotic episodes are not certain to recur, and if they don't the
psychosis would not be disabling. Our only point is to distinguish
between the nondisabling trigger of a disabling mental illness and the
mental illness itself. On the record compiled in the district court, it is
not possible to negate the inference that Palmer has in fact a disabling
mental illness.
117 F.3d at 352 (citations omitted); see also Bennett v. Unisys Corp., No.
2:99CV0446, 2000 WL 33126583, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2000); Coniglio v.
City of Berwyn, No. 99 C 4475, 2000 WL 967989, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. June 15,
2000); Martyne v. Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295, 2000 WL 748096, at *2
(N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000); Walker v. State of Ill., Dept. of Human Servs., No. 98 C
4555, 1999 WL 262133, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1999). These cases have not
responded directly to Rhoads and its progeny, likely because the Rhoads line of
cases has not yet been discussed or applied in any reported ADA or Section 504
mental impairment decisions. For scholarly treatment regarding the hurdles
faced by plaintiffs alleging mental impairment claims under the ADA, see Blair,
supra note 40, and Stefan, supra note 44.
93. Class-based analysis will often prematurely truncate the full
ADA/Section 504, disability/qualified, individual/reasonable accommodation
analysis, not just in Rhoads and its progeny, but in all cases where working is
the only major life activity substantially limited by an impairment. As such,
that broader outcome militates in favor of reassessing the validity of class-based
analysis in all cases involving the major life activity of working. That
reassessment, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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providing that same individual with unpaid leave, would
plausibly or likely remedy the workplace-caused impairment,
an employer would not have an absolute duty under the ADA
or Section 504 to provide such accommodation. Rather, under
the reasonable accommodation standard, an otherwise
reasonable accommodation such as a job transfer may become
unreasonable if a position is not available,9 4 or if the transfer
would displace a more senior employee.15  Likewise, an
employer may not be required to provide an otherwise
reasonable accommodation such as unpaid leave where the
leave occurs during an employer's busy season, or where the
employer would be forced to hire or schedule additional
workers, since providing the leave would be either
unreasonable or would work an undue hardship on the
employer."
Thus, courts, by applying traditional disability
discrimination/reasonable accommodation analysis-rather
than, as occurred in the Rhoads line of cases, altering the
evaluation of the disability and thereby avoiding reasonable
accommodation analysis altogether-would adequately
protect the legitimate interests of both the disability
discrimination claimant and his or her employer.
IV. RHOADS AND ITS PROGENY IN CONTEXT
The judicial decisions in Rhoads and its progeny are
symptomatic of the Supreme Court's and lower courts'
broader disdain for ADA and Section 504 claims. In
94. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (under the ADA, "[ilt is not reasonable to require an employer to
create a new job for the purpose of reassigning an employee to that job.")
(collecting cases).
95. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402-03 (2002) (ordinarily
not a reasonable accommodation to grant a transfer or job assignment in
violation of seniority system).
96. See, e.g., Deal v. Candid Color Sys., 153 F.3d 726 (Table), No. 97-6298,
1998 WL 381036, at *2 (10th Cir. July 6, 1998) (allowing plaintiff to work
whenever she was able would have imposed an undue hardship on employer's
business during busy season since employer would have to bring in second
employee to perform plaintiffs duties); Stubbs v. Marc Ctr., 950 F. Supp. 889,
895 (D. Ill. 1997) (request for accommodation that would temporarily shift
plaintiffs duties to co-workers and subordinates unreasonable as a matter of
law); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983) (assigning
other parts technicians to perform plaintiffs duties would impose an undue
hardship on employer).
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particular, the decisions illustrate a well-documented
tendency of the Supreme Court and other courts, acting as
judicial gatekeepers," to resolve disability discrimination
cases in favor of employers at the summary judgment stage
by determining that a plaintiff is not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA and Section 504." This tendency was
most graphically illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Sutton, where the Court, rejecting EEOC regulations, held
that the determination regarding whether an employee or job
applicant was disabled must be determined only after taking
into account corrective or mitigating measures available to
the individual."
By facilitating dismissal of ADA and Section 504 cases on
the threshold question of disabled status at the summary
judgment stage, the decisions in Rhoads and its progeny also
allow courts to avoid resolving the issue of whether or not an
employer failed to fulfill its statutory duty to reasonably
accommodate qualified individuals with disabilities.
97. Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword: Disability and Identity, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 907, 908 (2003) ("[Tlhe Court zealously has taken on a
gatekeeping role, ensuring that only those individuals with disabilities 'worthy'
of the appellation be afforded ADA protection.").
98. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101, 103, 110-26 (1999); American
Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403,
404-05 (1998); see also Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 79 (agreeing in part
with Professor Colker regarding judges' role in employer-favoring results in
ADA cases, but focusing on bad lawyering as the primary causal factor).
99. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 475, 482-83. As discussed
earlier, Sutton was legislatively overruled by Congress in the ADAAA. See
supra note 34. This is not to say that the question of whether a plaintiff is
disabled under the ADA and Section 504 is invariably a legal question
resolvable on summary judgment. Indeed, the question of whether a plaintiff is
disabled under disability discrimination statutes may well be factually disputed
such that resolution on summary judgment would be inappropriate. See, e.g.,
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 859-60 (9th
Cir. 2009). However, a review of ADA and Section 504 case law reveals that a
substantial number of disability discrimination claims-particularly, disability
discrimination cases where foreclosure analysis is utilized-are resolved against
employees on motions for summary judgment brought by employers. See, e.g.,
Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006);
Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004);
Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 287 (5th Cir. 2004); Sullivan v.
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 116-17 (1st Cir. 2004); Webb v.
Clyde L. Choate Mental Health and Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991, 998-99 (7th Cir.
2000).
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Judicial avoidance of the reasonable accommodation
inquiry is consistent with the courts' decisions on the
disability question. Indeed, if the Supreme Court and other
courts have been reluctant to recognize and protect
individuals who are indisputably impaired in one or more
major life activities as disabled under the ADA and Section
504-and thereby refuse to force employers to modify their
hiring and firing practices vis-A-vis such employees-then it
is not at all surprising that those same courts would create
and follow a judicial doctrine that allows courts to avoid
scrutinizing whether an employer modified its operational
practices to accommodate such employees. From the
perspective of courts and employers, if a contrary result on
the former question would improperly expand the class of
disability discrimination claimants, and would work a
significant incursion on employer hiring and firing practices,
then a contrary result on the latter question would require
courts and juries to evaluate and resolve the factually-
intensive reasonable accommodation issue.100 This latter
result would constitute an exponentially-greater invasion of
employer prerogative concerning the day-to-day operation of
their business."o1
100. Several courts of appeals have held that the question of whether an
employer has reasonably accommodated an employee under disability
discrimination statutes is ordinarily a question of fact. Lujan v. Pac. Maritime
Ass'n, 165 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1999); Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't
Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998). Consistent with this general rule,
numerous courts within the past few years have denied motions for summary
judgment on the reasonable accommodation issue. See, e.g., Waters v. Fred
Meyers Stores, Inc., No. CV-08-322-HU, 2009 WL 1874271, at *11 (D. Or. June
26, 2009); Walker v. Potter, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1175-76 (D. Haw. 2009);
Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-636, 2008 WL 4346781, at *17-18 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 18, 2008); Fitzsimmons v. City of Phx., No. CV-06-3103-PHX-DGC, 2008
WL 2225764, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 28, 2008); Monterroso v. Sullivan & Cromwell,
591 F. Supp. 2d 567, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
101. Scholars have recognized that the reasonable accommodation provision
of the ADA has both an antidiscrimination and redistributive component,
although they disagree on whether the redistributive component of the
reasonable accommodation provision differs in kind or in degree from other
antidiscrimination statutes. Compare Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson,
Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law
Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act? 79 N. C. L. REV. 307 (2001)
with Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642 (2001). However characterized, and as a matter of perception, if not
reality, the redistributive component of the reasonable accommodation
requirement has a more intrusive effect on capital expenditures and day-to-day
operations of an ADA-covered employer than the antidiscrimination component
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Yet, properly recognizing disability status under
traditional disability discrimination analysis, and giving full
play to the ADA and Section 504's reasonable accommodation
provisions, are clearly mandated by the stated purposes and
express language of the two congressional enactments.10 2
Indeed, Congress, by enacting ADAAA provisions calling for a
broad construction of the definition of disability and the
inclusion of episodic impairments, or impairments in
remission when active, within the definition of that term
when the requirements of the ADA have been otherwise
satisfied, further cements that mandate-at least as to the
disability status issue."o0 And, as to the legitimacy of
employer prerogative to manage its own internal operations
without judicial intrusion, court and employer concerns are
more imagined than real: empirical studies have
demonstrated that the cost to employers of affording
reasonable accommodations are relatively minimal, often
requiring no financial outlay and seldom costing over $150.104
Thus, the Rhoads line of cases constitutes one of the
more striking examples of lower courts formulating disability
discrimination doctrine that runs counter to law and logic.
The resulting application of that doctrine serves judicial and
employer interests in avoiding the full application of the ADA
and Section 504, thereby disserving the legitimate interests of
employees entitled to coverage under those disability
discrimination statutes.
CONCLUSION
When work and the workplace itself become a curse,
rather than a blessing-specifically, where work or the
workplace itself has caused or exacerbated an impairment
that substantially limits an employee's major life activities
beyond working-courts faced with ADA and Section 504
claims have gone astray. Those courts, by focusing on
causation and applying class-based analysis, have fashioned a
of the ADA.
102. See supra notes 6, 21-23, 49-55, and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 34.
104. Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title 1, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1671, 1674 (2000); Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace
Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902 (1997).
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legal standard that is at odds with congressional intent and
Supreme Court precedent, defies logic and raises issues of
proof not present in other disability discrimination cases, and
improperly short-circuits full disability/reasonable
accommodation analysis envisioned by Congress under the
ADA and Section 504.
The most recent court of appeals decision addressing this
matter has suggested that courts must follow and apply
Rhoads and its progeny,os unless and until Congress amends
disability discrimination law to require application of what
the district court in Rhoads referred to as "the traditional
approach found in the ADA;"'o however, such amendment
should be wholly unnecessary. Specifically, an amendment is
not necessary in light of Congress's clear statement of intent
regarding the irrelevance of causation in disability
discrimination analysis and recent amendments to the ADA
concerning the broad definition of disability and coverage of
episodic impairments, as well as the Supreme Court's equally
clear circumscription of class-based analysis where
impairments substantially limit major life activities other
than working.
Thus, unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton,
Rhoads and its progeny constitute aberrational, judge-made
law under circumstances where both Congress and the
Supreme Court have already spoken. Also, in contrast to
Sutton, Rhoads-inspired case law has not yet migrated to
more than a few courts of appeals. As such, unlike Sutton,
the fix to the problems created by Rhoads and its progeny
should come from other courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court, and not from Congress.
105. See Tyler v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 42 F. Appx. 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 956 F. Supp. 1239, 1247 (D. Md. 1997)); see also
supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
106. Rhoads, 956 F. Supp. at 1247; see also supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text.
